Appendix Reference

Analysis Guru

Appendix Reference

This lecture may seem to be a deep triviality, but don’t underestimate the importance of the oxymoron.

I received a request from the Webmaster of Columbiassacrifice.com to review sections of the CAIB Final Report since some projectile test methods seemed unsupported. So I spent several more hours reviewing the report. I had my thoughts about the types of authors and readers intended for this document. Was it prepared to appeal to a limited audience who could comprehend convoluted characteristics and complex technical details?

I encountered the Webmaster’s problem too. I theorize the people who drafted the document were so intimately aware of analytical methods, testimony, and other data not explicitly included in the document that they subconsciously could grasp ambiguous content. However, this places those without access to the same familiarity at a disadvantage, in particular the technical writers who must translate concepts for all applicable audiences by using a "monkey see, monkey do" approach. I went down that proverbial road several years ago as a young engineer reviewing and editing a fire protection report to supplement other safety documentation for a nuclear power plant. It can be a very difficult process to achieve consensus throughout numerous realms of responsibility and at the same time avoid the pitfalls of group thinking for even a simple concept. So I wasn’t all that surprised to find another discrepancy in the report.

I determined that one of the section references was inconsistent with the associated material context. A computer scientist might relate this problem as being analogous to a computer program balking when a pointer has been coded to the wrong memory address, but I doubt the best software made in the world could have caught the mistake.

Then, I had to decide what to do about the problem. The disbanding of the CAIB upon job completion could complicate things. I ultimately conveyed the issue to the head of NASA so that he could let his geniuses deal with it. The merit would be that NASA could efficiently learn from mistakes if they could understand the material better.

Transcripts of communications are as follows:

Thursday, November 20, 2003 5:29 PM
From: Weldon K. Chafin, Jr.
To: Sean O'Keefe, NASA Administrator

Subject: CAIB Report Error: Appendix E.4, RCC Impact Analysis reference

Mr. O'Keefe:

I have found another error in the CAIB Final Report. Allow me to elaborate.

Ref: CAIB Final Report

Volume I, Pg. 145:
To determine potential RCC damage, analysts used a Crater-like algorithm that was calibrated in 1984 by impact data from ice projectiles. At the time the algorithm was empirically tested, ice was considered the only realistic threat to RCC integrity. (See Appendix E.4, RCC Impact Analysis.)

This reference to Appendix E.4 is an error. The content in Appendix E.4 mainly concerned identifying the day-2 debris object by means of radar imaging techniques applicable to RCC and other potential materials. The correct reference should have been Appendix D.8, Debris Transport Analysis since Appendix D.8 does refer to ice as potential projectiles in addition to impact analysis.

Ref: CAIB Final Report

Appendix D.8 Debris Transport Analysis

Volume 2 Part 8,

Pg.4

These analyses along with the inputs from the Image Analysis Team and the ET Project were used to estimate a range of debris dimensions and corresponding weights for the foam debris. These upper and lower velocity and corresponding weight ranges are listed in Table 1-1 along with one of the debris sizes analyzed during the STS-107 and the values used in RCC impact tests. The STS-107 result corresponds to the debris size and impact location closest to the test article used in the RCC impact tests.

Pg. 8

2.4 STS-107 DEBRIS TRANSPORT ASSESSMENT APPROACH

The overall process consisted of three types of analysis followed by an integration of the results. These steps are listed below:

* Review of relevant inputs from other groups

* Image Analysis Team

* ET Project

* Boeing Debris Transport Program

* Assessment of the STS-107 Image Analysis Team 3-dimensional trajectories using physics based trajectory codes and CFD flowfields

* Simulation of debris trajectories using unsteady 6-DOF CFD codes.

* Integration of results to produce inputs for Southwest Research Institute Impact tests

Note that I only identify the starting point of the error and not necessarily the extent and complete consequences of the error. I'm sorry I didn't discover this error sooner. I'm not a NASA employee. As such, I'm not in a position to efficiently solve NASA problems. I hope others had the vigilance to identify this error as well.

Respectfully,

Weldon K. Chafin, Jr.

But just how would NASA respond to my reasoning since I don’t belong to the same culture? The distribution and date for the following message are unclear since the message could have been indirectly transmitted through multitudes of NASA personnel. O’Keefe probably delegated the responsibility to Readdy.

Sometime between Thursday, November 20, 2003 5:29 PM and Wednesday, November 26, 2003 2:27 PM:

From: POULOS, STEVE M., JR (JSC-MV) (NASA)
To: William Readdy, AA for Space Flight, NASA HQ

Subject: RE: CAIB Report Error: Appendix E.4, RCC Impact Analysis reference

Mr. Chafin is correct in the error he identified. I reviewed the report and the references and I agree with his assessment.

Steve

Evidently, I presented my case well. I received the following BlackBerry response from Readdy.

Wednesday, November 26, 2003 2:27 PM
From: William Readdy, AA for Space Flight, NASA HQ
To: Weldon K. Chafin, Jr.
Cc: "RTF Suggestions" <rtfsuggestions@NASA.gov>
Subject: CAIB Errata

Mr. Chafin,

Thanks for your note to Sean O'Keefe. We appreciate folks like you with such an ' eagle eye' and attention to detail. As you may know, the Independent CAIB completed its work and has disbanded. The information you provided has been fed to the Return to Flight Team. Steve Poulos, Orbiter Project Mgr, verified your assessment and that has been noted by the RTF Team. That said, the CAIB's clerical error did not decrease in the relevance of the CAIB conclusions and recommendations. Please feel free to send any further errata you uncover directly to: rtfsuggestions@NASA.gov I assure you that all suggestions sent there will be handled promptly by our professional RTF staff.

Happy Thanksgiving!

William Readdy, AA for Space Flight, NASA HQ

One might expect that this clerical error should have been precluded by the elite group of Board Members of the CAIB during a review process. However, there was pressure to publish quickly in order to meet a political schedule. If secularism can be disregarded, then try relating my theories to the Holy Bible, Isaiah Chapter 29 verses 11 and 12 which states:

The whole vision has become to you like the words of a book that is sealed, which men deliver to one who is literate saying, "Read this, please", and he says "I cannot, for it is sealed." Then the book is delivered to one who is illiterate, saying, "Read this, please"; and he says, "I am not literate."

I don’t think this issue presented as much risk to NASA as the Earth’s rotation rate error I had caught earlier.

End of another lesson.

School’s out.